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UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

ILAw REVIEW announces.

with pleasure the election of its officers for next year as follows:
Mr. Philip Wallis, Editor-in-Chief; Mr. Charles I. Thompson, Case

Hditor; Mr. William C. Ferguson, Jr., Book Review Editor; and
Mr. Artemas C. Leslie, Business Manager.
TaF INCO.STITUTIONA.IT\ OF MINIMUM WAGE LAws.-The
Constitution, although it protects a person from being deprived "of
life, liberty or property without due process of law," does not de'Const.

Amends. Arts. V anti XIV.
(36o)
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fine due process. Nor has the Supreme Court laid down any definite
rule by which due process can be ascertained other than the statement that when the state or federal government acts unreasonably
or arbitrarily it. violates the Constitution. ' But it is clear that
the exercise of the police power in a reasonable way was not intended to be prohibited. 1 Since the determination of what is reasonable or arbitrary must be purely a matter of opinion, the validity
of statutes, especially those passed under the police power, often
depends upon the personal equation of the particular justices-their
economic and social beliefs. This is particularly true in the case of
so-called labor legislation; for then two great social theories are
usually brought into conflict. On the one hand we have the belief
as expressed by Blackstone that "the public good is in nothing more
essentially interested than in the protection of every individual's
private rights" 4 and as sometimes tersely stated "that government
governs best which governs least." On the other hand, there is the
belief that it is better to sacrifice certain phases of abstract individual freedom for the sake of the general welfare which, it is thought,
can be obtained under paternalistic legislation.
The former doctrine---often characterized as that of laissez
faire-prevailed in the recent decision ' holding the Minimum Wage
Law for Women of the District of Columbia" unconstitutional. 7
The Supreme Court had been called upon only once before to determine the constitutionality of a minimum wage law and the result
was an equally divided court. ' The decision in the recent case was
1

Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356 (0%86),

Smith v. Texas, 233 U. S.

63o (1914); Chicago etc. R. Co. v. Wisconsin, 238 U. S. 491 (1915).

For

criticism of the Court's interpretation of the two amendments, see Robert P.
Reeder, Validity of Rate Regulations, 248 (19T4 ed.).
'Knoxville Iron Co. v. Harbison, 183 U. S. 13 (i9o1); Adair v. United
States, 208 U. S. 16i (igoS), p. 173: "Both property and liberty are held

on such reasonable conditions as may be imposed by the governing power
of the State in the exercise of those powers and with such conditions the
Fourteenth Amendment was not designed to interfere" Mountain Timber
Co. v. Washingon, 243 U. S. 219, 238 (1917).
4
Comm. 139 (Lewis Ed., i9o2).

'The Minimum Wage Board of the District of Columbia v. The Chil-

dren's Hospital of the District of Columbia, No. 795, Oct. Term,

1922

(April

9, 1923).

' The law provided for the creation of a board to investigate and ascer-

tain the wages of women and minors, and to declare standards of minimum
wages for women and minors in any occupation, in order to supply the
necessary cost of living to women workers to maintain them in good health

and to protect their morals, and to prevent unreasonably low wages to minors.
I The vote was 5 to 3. Taft, C. J., Holmes, J, and Sanford, J., dissented. Brandeis, J., took no part in the decision.
'Stettler v. Q'Hara et al.. 243 U. S. 6-9 (1917). No opinion was filed.
Wilson v. New, 243 U. S. 332 (1917), upheld the Adamson Act fixing minimum wages for railroad employes. But that was in an emergency and was
only a temporary measure pending investigation.
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predicated upon the ground that there was an unconstitutional interference with the freedom of contract.
It is well established that the freedom of contract is protected
under the due process clauses. I The state courts no less than the
Supreme Court have jealously guarded in no uncertain terms this
contractual freedom especially where statutes sought to regulate
contracts of employment.'" But it has also become well recognized
that the exercise of the police power may lawfully infringe the freedom of contract. Thus the Supreme Court has held statutes constitutional which compelled mine operators to pay wages according
to mine weight before screening, "1 prohibited masters from paying
seamen in advance,12 prohibited contractors to pay employees less
often than semi-monthly, 13 compelled employers to cash strip or store
orders, 14 limited the right to assign wages to be earned, 5 limited the
hours of labor in a mine, 16 forbade the employment of any person
in any mill, factory or manufacturing establishment beyond ten
hours a day and which allowed three hours' overtime at time
and a half of the regular wage. 17
It is, therefore, apparent that the Supreme Court has by no
means adhered to the strict individualistic theory and in view of
these decisions the Minimiumn Wage Case is disappointing. Upon principle it is difficult to.understand how the fixing of a minimum wage
for women is any more a violation of the freedom of contract than
regulations as to the manner and time of payment of wages or than
the fixing of maximum hours of lalor. Indeed, in Biinting v. Oregon " the minimum wage for overtime was fixed as to all persons.
Allgeyer v. Louisiana, x65 U. S. 578, 591 (1896); Adair v. United
States, supra; Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U. S. r, 14 (x915): "Included in the

right of personal liberty and the right of private property-partaking of the
nature of each-is the right to make contracts for the acquisition of property. Chief among such contracts is that of personal employment. . ..
'Godcharles v. Wigeman, 113 Pa. 43r, 6 Atl. 354 (1886). The statute
required the payment of wages in money. At p. 437, ". . . more than this'it
is an insulting attempt to put the laborer under a legislative tutelage, which
is not only degrading to his manhood, but subversive of his right as a citizen
of the United States. He may sell his labor for what he thinks best. . . ."
Ramsey v. People, 142 I1. 38o, 32 N. E. 364 (1892), in which the statute
declared that the pay should be computed on unscreened coal. People v.
Marcus, z85 N. Y. 257, 77 N. E. 1073 (i9o6), where the statute forbade employers from prohibiting employes tojoin the union.
'McLean v. Arkansas, 211 U. S. 539 (i9o9).
Patterson v. Bark Eudora, igo U. S. r69 (i9o3).;
"Erie R. Co. v. Williams, 233 U. S. 685 (1914).
"Knoxville Iron Co. v. Harbison, supra, in Note 3.

"'Mutual
'

Loan

Co.

v. Martell,

222

U. S. 225 (91u).

Holden v. Hardy, x69 U. S. 366 (1897).
Bunting v. Oregon, 2Q U. S. 426 (i917).
Supra in Note 17.

NOTES

Even if the limitation of hours of labor does not have the practical
effect of increasing the wages per hour, it can hardly be said that the
amount of wages is any more, in the language of the court, "the
heart of the contract" 9 than the number of hours of labor. The
consideration of the one enters into the fixing of the other. If the
law limiting the hours of labor leaves the parties free to cofltract
about the wages, the fixing of wages leaves the parties free to contract as to the hours of labor. 20
Furthermore, the comfort which the court gets from the Nineteenth Amendment is unwarranted. The amendment gives women
political rights, but does not for that reason render them practically
and economically equal to men. But irrespective of that, necessitous
persons can rarely be said to be free to do as they will and in a
present exigency will accept employment under unfair terms. The
liberty to contract freely which the court is so careful to safeguard
for the employees may mean a great deal to the academic theorist,but to the laborer it means little because it is already limited by circumstances. It was said in Holden %?.Hardy 21 "the proprietors lay
down the rules and the laborers are practically constrained to obey
them . . . But the fact that both parties are of full age and
competent to contract does not necessarily ddprive the State of the
power to interfere where the parties do not stand upon an equality, or where the public health demands that one party to the contract shall be protected against himself. 'The State still retains an
interest in his welfare, however reckless he may be. The whole is
not greater than the sum of all the parts, and when the individual
health, safety and welfare are sacrificed or neglected, the State must
suffer.'"
The purpose of the minimum wage laws generally is to insure
that those who give a day's work shall receive a day's support in
return. 22 It was felt by proponents of such laws that wages fixed
merely by the economic law of supply and demand, at least in the
case of women, did not accomplish this result. That this belief has
substantial ground for support is indicated by statistics 23 and by the
"It is sufficient now to point out that the latter as well as the Statutes
mentioned under paragraph 3, deal with incidents of employment having no
necessary effect upon the heart of the contract, that is the amount of wages
to be paid and received. A law forbidding work to continue beyond a
given number of hours leaves the parties free to contract about wages... :,
"If a maximum hour law were enforced this might not be so, but it
could hardly be argued that a maximum wage law is unconstitutional because an hours of labor law has been passed first or vice versa.
" Supra in Note 16.
"See Thomas Reed Powell, The Constitutional Issue in Minimum-Wage
Legislation, 2 MINN. LAw REvI-w x (1917).
See brief of appellants in the principal case.
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passage of minimum wage laws in so many states and countries.24
As has already been pointed out, there is no difference in kind or
degree of interference with the freedom of contract caused by minimum wage laws than the maximum hour laws. There may be a difference in the need and appropriateness of one as compared to the
other; but respectable authority substantiates the need for minimum
wage laws and the court in its decision-should have recognized as a
proper exercise of the police function the bona fide attempt to meet
such need. Even though the theory of the legislation may be economically unsound the court should have, in deciding a question under
the Constitution, yielded their contrary social dogmas. 21 "The Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social
Statics. . . . But 'a constitution is not intended to embody a
particular economic theory, whether of paternalism and the organic
relation of the citizen to the State or of laissez faire." 28
The court's fear that the right to enact minimum wage laws
will authorize the passage of maximum wage laws has no basis. One
does not necessarily follow from the other. The circumstances
which justify a minimum wage law would make a maximum wage
law arbitrary and unreasonable. And if an extraordinary state of
affairs existed by which labor was in a position to exact such gross
wages that the mulcted industries would be unable to continue, then
perhaps maximum wage laws would not be so unwelcome.
The employer was not unduly iimposed upon by the minimum
wage law in question. It is true that he was compelled to pay at
least what the commission ordered, but the wage fixed bore a
relation to the particular industry. This was shown by the fact
that the sums differed in different occupations. If the woman employed was not worth the minimum wage he could have discharged
her and employed one that was.27 If the minimum was so high that
"Outside of the District of Columbia the following states and countries
have passed minimum wage legislation: Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Kansas, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nebraska, North Dakota, Oregon,
Texas, Utah, Washington, Wisconsin, Porto Rico, Great Britain, Canada,
Australia, New Zealand, Argentina, France and Norway.
Holmes, J. (dissenting),
'Lochner v. New York, x98 U. S. 45 (9o5).
said at p. 75: "This case is decided upon an economic theory which a large
part of the country does not entertain. If it were a question whether I
agree with that theory, I should desire to study it further and long before
making up my mind. But I do not concede that to be my duty, because I
strongly believe that my agreement or disagreement has nothing to do with
the right of a majority to embody their opinions in law."
" Lochner v. New York, supra, in Note 25, at p..75.
" The press has commented on the objections raised by women themselves
to minimum wage legislation applying only to women. They argued that the
practical result of such legislation is that many employers, finding* the employment of women unprofitable under these laws, discharge them in favor
of men. See an article in the New York Times, March 25, z9M. For an
able discussion of this objection and an answer to it, see Powell, supra in
Note 22, at p. i&

NOTES

none could have been found who would have actnally earned it,
there would, it is true, have been cause for saying that the employer
was wrongfully deprived of his property. That contention was
not made in the instanf case nor did the court rely upon such reason. The further objection that the statute was uncertain and probably failed to achieve fully its purposes should not have rendered it
unconstitutional. Legislation need not at its very birth rise fully
armed and perfect."8 Minimum wage legislation is still in its experimental stage and must be given an opportunity to perfect
itself.
Instead of following the policy of previous decisions culminat-.
ing in Bunting v. Oregon,29 which seemed to indicate a growing liberality in allowing the police power to interfere with the freedom
to contract, the court has reverted to Lochner v. Nc-u York,30
which has always been considered an unfortunate decision and had
been supposed to have been overruled by Bunting v. Oregon. The
inference must be that, as at present constituted, the court has once
more returned to the eighteenth century philosophy of the Lochner
Case.
S.A.G.
TiiE EFFECT OF A CONDITION UPON THE VT ALIDITY OF AX INNEGOTIABLE I NSTRUCMENT.-The Negotiable Instruments

TENDED

Law has solved most of the difficulties which, before its passage, resulted in conflicting views on important problems in the law of
commercial paper, by codifying what was considered the better rule
in each instance. One unanticipated and wholly unnecessary dilemma
in the law is traceable to the tremendously important place in the
modern business world of negotiable instruments, the comparative insignificance of non-negotiable paper, and a resulting carelessness on
the part of judges, authors, and draftsmen in not continuing the
previously existing well-defined line of distinction between negotiable
and non-negotiable bills and notes. The* Negotiable Instruments
Law uses the word "bill" as a synonym for bill of exchange, and
"note" to mean negotiable promissory note. I Learned -text-writers,
'Mutual Loan Co. v. Martell, Supra in Note 15, at p. 235, "Ve shall
only repeat that the classification need not be scientific nor logically appropriate. . . ." Rosenthal v. New York, 226 U. S. 26o. 271 (1912): "But the
Federal Constitution does not require that all state laws shall be perfect,
nor that the entire field of proper legislation shall be covered by a single
enactment."
"Supra in Note z7.
Supra in Note 25.
I N. I. L. sec. x91. This section is referred to at greater length post.(The italics are ours.)
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as will be pointed out in detail hereafter, use the term "bills and
notes" as equivalent to "negotiable instruments." Courts have as a
consequence been lead into the same ambiguity. 2
What is the present status of a non-negotiable promissory note
or bill of exchange? With the exception of negotiability does it
possess the same characteristics and require the same elements as
its gigantic offspring, the negotiable instrument? Does a condition
which destroys the negotiability of an order bill or note simply render the instrument non-negotiable, or does it completely invalidate it
as a bill or a note?
in Liberty State Bank v. Metropolitan Church Association,' a
recent Minnesota case, an instrument in the form of a negotiable
promissory note was payable to the order of the plaintiff and stated
that it was given for value received, and was payable out of certain
rents. The court said that since the plaintiff was the payee it was
unnecessary to decide whether the note was negotiable under the
N. I. L. Since the promise to pay on its face stated value received there was a sufficient allegation of consideration to establish
a prima facie case from the instrument itself, if it was shown affirmatively by the plaintiff that the condition was fulfilled.
Such a condition as the one in the instrument of the principal
case clearly destroys its negotiability.4 The court referred to the
instrument as a promissory note, but stated that it was unnecessary
td decide upon the question of its negotiability. Since the instrument was in fact not negotiable, this assertion by the court amounts
practically to a declaration that it was a non-negotiable promissory
note. Thus it is possible by a slight stretching of the actual decision
to say that the case stands for the following proposition: a condition which renders a promissory note non-negotiable does not destroy its fundamental characteristic as a mercantile specialty.'
Before considering the effect, if any, of the N. I. L. upon non*Cases cited post.
'i9! N. W. 414 (Minn. 1923).
'N. I. L. sec. r (2). "An instrument to be negotiable . .
must contain an unconditional promise or order to pay a sum certain in money."
Sec. 3 (2) "An order or promise to pay out of a particular fund is not
unconditional." A note payable "out of rents" is not negotiable. I Daniel,
Negotiable Instruments 57 (sth ed. 19o3), and cases cited therein.
*It is important to note that in this particular case it was unnecessary
for the court to decide whether the instrument was a note or a mere written
contract to pay money. If it was the latter, the result would be the same,
for the words "for value received" in a written contract are prima facia evidence of a sufficient consideration. Hoyt v. Jaffray, 29 11. 104 (1862);
Rourne v. Ward, 5r Me. ior (1863) ; Hamilton v. Hamilton. 127 App. Div.
871, IT2 N. Y. S. TO (1908). The recital in the instrument is a sufficient
allegation of consideration. Elmquist v. Markoe, 39 Minn. 494 (1888); I
Daniel, Negotiable Instruments, sec. 163 (5th ed. x9o3).

NOTES
negotiable instruments it seems necessary to determine the status of
bills and -notes of this character before the Act. One searching for
the'requirements of a non-negotiable mercantile specialty might peruse leading texts and manifold decisions by the hour and be rewarded by confusing ambiguities. This much is perfectly clearall jurisdictions held that a non-negotiable bill of exchange imported
consideration, whether the words "for value received" appeared or
not.0 The majority of courts found a similar characteristic in nonnegotiable promissory notes.T The latter decisions were for the most
part based on a re-enactment of the English Statute of Anne which
made promissory notes similar to bills of exchange, in that they
thereafter possessed the quality of negotiability and imported consideration." Other states seem to have adopted the Statute of Anne
as part of their common law.' All jurisdictions held that nonnegotiable promissory notes imported consideration when value received was alleged on the face of the instrument.la
Whether a condition destroying negotiability invalidates an
intended negotiable instrument as a mercantile specialty depends obviously upon the requirements of a non-negotiable bill or note. It is
upon this point that the authorities are in irreconcilable confusion.
The statement in Daniels on Negotiable Instruments21 is typical. The title reads as follows: "Instruments payable out of a
particular fund not negotiable." The opening sentence says: "The
character of the instrument as a bill or note is destroyed if . . .
payable out of a particular fund." 12 Does he mean that the negotiability is destroyed or merely its character as a mercantile specialty? Similarly, Norton in his text on "Bills and Notes" titles section 14, "Essentials of Bill or Note." Immediately below he states
"To be a negotiable bill of exchange or promissory note the instrument must have the following essential characteristics." 23
Corpus Juris, after stating the essential characteristics of a bill
or note, says in section 2o6:1" "However, an instrument may be
'valid' although conditional or uncertain, it being necessary to dis'Coursin v. Ledlie's Administrators, 31 Pa. 5o6 (1858); Arnold v.

Sprague, 34 Vt. 4o2 (i86r); Louisville etc. Ry. Co. v. Caldwell, 98 Ind. -45

(x884); 8 C. J. 993.; I Daniel, Negotiable Instruments 182 (5th ed., i9o3).
'Eleven states held that a non-negotiable note imports a consideration
and six states held it did not. See 8 C. J. 993., I Daniel, Negotiable Instruments (5th ed., 19o3) 183. Pennsylvania held with the minority. Pfaff's
Estate, 14 Dist. 193 (Pa. i9o5); Sidle v. Anderson, 45 Pa. 464 (1863).

'I Daniel, Negotiable Instruments, sec. z63 (5th ed., i9o3); I Parsons,
Notes and Bills I (871

ed.) ; Nbrton, Bills and Notes 9 (4th ed. x914).

' Richards v. Barlow, i4o Mass. 218, 6 N. E. 68 (i885).
'

Supra in Note

S.

(5th ed. i9o3).
'1 Sec. 50, p. 57. (The italics are ours.)
ed.114), p.3,.
"8th
118 C. J. IT+
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tinguish between 'validity' and 'negotiability.'" A. note under this
statement refers back to section 52,_1 which states that non-negotiable bills and notes have a -validity and effect of their own as
common-law contracts. This is confusing because it seems to place
non-negotiable instruments on the same plane as common law contracts. Section 212 16 states that a condition renders the instrument
non-negotiable. This seems an implication that though non-negotiable, it still has validity as a bill or note. 17
It is believed that, before the N. I. L. at least, the formal requisites established for negotiable bills and notes applied to those
which were not negotiable, and that, if they were not complied with,
the paper was not a bill or note at'all, but a mere simple contract.
Story, in his work on Promissory Notes' 8 states that the instrument, in order to be a valid promissory note must (inter alia) be
for the payment of money only;" and for a fixed and certain
amount ;20 and must not be payable out of a particular fund. 21
There is no indication that he means negotiable promissory note.
Justice Mitchell, of Minnesota, said: "Daniel, Randolph and
Tiedeman-all of them treat the question as if it only went to the
negotiability of the instruments, whereas the real question lies back
of that, and is whether they are promissory notes or bills of exchange at all." 22 Chief Justice Cooley, of Michigan, said: "The
instrument is not, under the authorities in this State, nor under the
elementary authorities, a promissory note, either negotiable or nonnegotiable, and is not therefore subjec to the rules governing commercial paper. It lacks the required elements of certainty in time
and amount of payment. . . . The so-called note being no more
than a simple contract, not a note. . . ." 23
That the formal requisites are applicable to non-negotiable as
well as to negotiable bills and notes may be proved by the decisions
of many cases even where the language of the court does not expressly say so. For instance, a non-negotiable bill of exchange, by
the universal rule imports consideration; but when drawn on a par18 C. J. St.
"8 C. J. imp.

'Another confusing inconsistency is to be noticed in Corpus Juris. In
8 C. J. 52 there is a statement that "the consideration of a non-negotiable instrument must ordinarily be proved." In 8 C. J. 993 it says that. "a non-negotiable bill imports a consideration. As to non-negotiable notes there has
been much conflict."
2 (7th ed. 1878).
Sec. x7. (The italics are ours.)
SSec. 20.
T
Sec. 25.
Hastings v. Thompson, 54 Minn. z84, 55 N. W. 968 (x893).
'Story v. Lamb. 52 Mich. 525, 18 N. W. 248 (1884). To the same
effect are Moore v. Edwards, 167 Mass. 74 (x96); Coursin v. Ledlie's Administrator, supra in Note 6; Carnwright v. Gray, 127 N. Y. 92 (1891).

NOTES

ticular fund consideration is not presumed. 2 Is not' this another
way of saying that the condition destroys its commercial character? The cases are susceptible of no other conclusion. 25
Undoubtedly the modem ambiguity found in the books is
caused by the fact that courts are properly disinclined to decide anything unnecessary to the particular case under consideration. The case
is exceptional in which more than a decision as. to the negotiability
of *an instrument is required. As a rule, when the courts say that
such and such a thing renders the instrument non-negotiable the
rights of the parties are decided and it is not necessary to go further and say whether the instrument is then a non-negotiable bill or
note or a common-law contract.
Assuming it to be proved that before the N. I. L. non-negotiable
instruments necessitated the same formal requisites as negotiable
paper, what effect has that Act had upon them? The N. I. L. is,
in its main title, called "a general act relating to negotiable instruments," thereby disclaiming at its beginning any relation to nonnegotiable paper. In addition several cases have held that the rights
of parties to non-negotiable instruments are unaffected by the Act. 26
Section 191 of the N. I. L. reads: "'Bill' means bill of exchange, and 'note' means negotiable promissory note." The corresponding section of the English act reads, "'Bill' means bill of exchange and 'note' means promissory note." 27 It is at least interesting to note that the word "negotiable" was prefixed to promissofy
note and not to bill of exchange in the N. "1. L. Could this mean
that the N. I. L. was intended to cover both negotiable and nonnegotiable bills of exchange and only negotiable promissory notes?
The same inconsistency is found in sections 126 and 184. Section

I-6 provides, "A bill of exchange is an unconditional order . . .
to pay . . . a sum certain in money to order or to bearer!' Section
. .,"
again dif184 provides, "A negotiable promissory note
fering from the English act in the insertion of the word negotiable. 25
What was the purpose of the draftsmen in thus twice adding

"negotiable" to the definition of. a note and twice omitting it in the
definition of a bill? It is perfectly evident that, should the express
2Josselyn v. Lacier. io Mod. 294, 88 Reprint 7i34 (Eng. 7715); Kelly v.
Bronson, 26 Minn. 359 (i88o); Conroy v. Ferree, 68 Minn. 325. 71 N. W. 383
(1897): Averett's Administrator v. Booker. 15 Grat. 163 (Va. 1859); National Savings Bank v. Cable, 73 Conn. 568, 48 Atl. 428 (ioi).
"IowA LtAw Buumr.'iN 70 (i92).
'4Westberg v. Chicago Lumber Co., 117 Wis. 589, 94 N. IV. 572 (1903);
Windsor Cement Co. v. Thompson, 86 Conn. sir. 86 Atl. T (1913). A complete collection of these cases will be found in Brannan's Negotiable Instruments Law (3d ed. xgig), note x.
" B. E. A. s. 2. (The italics above are ours.)

OB. E. A. s. 83 (z).

(The italics above are ours.)
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words of the statute be followed, section

126

by limiting bills of ex-

change to those drawn "to order or to bearer" would abolish nonnegotiable bills of exchange altogether, but section 84 would not
affect non-negotiable promissory -notes. Almost unquestionably the
courts would regard this inconsistency as a mere lapsus styli and
hold that the N. I. L. does not affect non-negotiable paper.
Two New York cases ' have held that although the N. I. L
does not concern non-negotiable instruments, it does repeal the
former statutes through which non-negotiable instruments imported
consideration."0 Corpus Juris states generally on the authority of
these two cases that since the N. I. L. non-fnegotiable instruments
do not import consideration. Unquestionably the New York N. I.
L. does repeal the statutes which gave this class of paper its presumption of consideration, "I but the Corpus Juris statement is far
too broad. It must be remembered that New York is a code state,
and that non-negotiable instruments imported consideration because
there was such a provision in the code.
Generally, bills of exchange derive- their special character directly from the law merchant and consequently import consideration irrespective of any statute whether negotiable or not. ' 2 The
Statute of Anne and similar statutes merely gave promissory notes
the characteristics of bills. "3
The Statute of Anne was never accepted as part of the common law of Pennsylvania and was never re-enacted. Hence bills,
negotiable or non-negotiable, import consideration while non-negotiable notes do not." The law is, therefore, unaffected by the N. I. L.,
unless, as pointed out supra, section 126 of the act should be literally construed, in which case non-negotiable bills would be abolished. In California, non-negotiable bills and notes import consideration by virtue of the civil code of the state.'5 Since the N. I. L.
does not repeal this section, the law is unchanged.
So the following possible situations arise under the N. I. L. in
the various jurisdictions. In Code states where both non-negotiable
bills and notes were given a statutory presumption of consideration
-Deyo v. Thompson, 53 App. Div. 9, 65 N. Y. S,
Lockwood, 79 Misc. 61g, 4o N. Y. S. 513 (1913).
"8 C J. 94.
' N. Y. Laws of x897, Chap. 6T2, p. 7S8.

459 (r90o) ;

Kinsella v.

'Norton, Bills and Notes 6 (4th ed. 1914); r Daniel, Negotiable Instruments 182 (5th ed. i9o3). See, also, cases cited sspra in Note 24.
=x Daniel, Negotiable Instruments 183 (5th ed. 1903); Norton, Bills

and Notes 7 (4th ed. 1914). Norton declares that this is the commonly
accepted view, but incorrect because promissory notes were actually within
the custom of merchants and possessed the characteristics of a mercantile
specialty before the Statute of Anne.
"Pfaff's Estate, supra in Note 7.
" Secs. x6x4, 1615.

NOTES

and this section was repealed by section 197 of the N. I. L., nonnegotiable instruments no longer import consideration. 3" In states
where the Statute of Anne had been in effect re-enacted and not
repealed by the N. I. L., non-negotiable bills and -notes do import
consideration. -1 In states where the non-negotiable bills,* but not

notes, imported consideration before the Act, the law would also be
unchanged, -unless, of course, section 126 of the N. I. L. would be
literally followed."
The above statement of the law does not refer to non-negotiable
paper on which a statement appears that it was given "for value
received." In such a case, it has been generally held that there is a
prima facie consideration, for the statement is an admission by the
maker. 39
Going back to Liberty State Bank v. Metropolitan Church Asso.ciation,'0 the result reached by the court is undoubtedly correct.
But if the conclusions set forth herein, that a condition which renders an intended negotiable instrument non-negotiable also invalidates the bill or note as a mercantile specialty, the court erred in referring to the instrument as a promissory note.
It may appear that since the result was correct we quarrel at
great length over a mere trifle. But a reference to the confusing ambiguities and inconsistencies which have already grown into the law
of bills and notes as a result of failing to distinguish between the
non-negotiability and invalidity of an instrument, seems to justify
an appeal for clarity in the future. What is really needed is a
careful and exhaustive textbook, or supplement to works already in
existence, upon the subject of non-negotiable instruments. It is believed that no such treatise exists. 1

C.I.T.
THE DOCTRINE OF LACK OF MUTUALITY AS A DEFENSE TO

DEcisIoNs.-The repudiation of
the strict doctrine of lack of mutuality as a defense to specific performance, which had become general in the two decades before the
World War, has become almost universal iri
the cases since the war.
There were two main aspects to this strict doctrine. The first, muSPECIFIC PERFORMANCE IN RECENT

tuality of remedy, embodied the principle that equity would not
' New York.
S,California.

- Pennsylvania.
"See Note , sium.
* Supra in Note 3.
'Bolles' Pennsylvania Law of Negotiable and Non-negotiable Instruments (z898) is the most recent authority which purports to deal with the

subject
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grant specific relief to the plaintiff unless the defendant, if he had
sued, could have obtained specific performance from the plaintiff."
The second, mutuality of obligation, declared that equity would not
grant specific performance of the defendant's contract if the plaintiff was left free by the terms of the contract to terminate it at any
time, and so, as the court said in one case, "render nugatory any decree . . . made." 2 This doctrine went for years without serious challenge in the courts. The judges were apparently satisfied
to load the doctrine with a most confusing mass of exceptions, 3
rather than repudiate it and build from a more substantial foundation. As it was the text-writers, Fry 4 and Pomeroy, I who served
to -fix this doctrine so firmly in the imagination of the courts, so it
was the writers in the Law Reviews, led by Professor William
Draper Lewis 0 and Dean Ames, 7 whQ were chiefly responsible for
freeing them of its cramping influence, It is not the purpose of this
note to outline either the criticisms levelled at the doctrine or the
substitutes suggested for it. Al multitude of texts 8 and articles'
have adequately covered these matters. The aim here is simply to
trace the various aspects of the doctrine through the more recent
American cases. °
The strict doctrine that mutuality of remedy and of obligation
must exist not only at the time suit is brought but also at the
time the contract is made has almost disappeared from American
Fry, Specific Performance (3d ed.), 215: "The contract to be specifically
enforced must, as a general rule, be mutual-that is to say such that it
might, at the time it was entered into, have been enforced by either of the
parties against the other."*
'Rust v. Conrad, 47 Mich. 449, 11 N. W. 265 (1882).
'See Clark, Equity, Sees. i74-i8o, where ten exceptions to Lord Justice
Fry's statement of the rule are noted.
'Supra in Note z.
h Pomeroy, Equitable Remedies (ist ed.), Sec. 769: "If at the time of
the filing of the bill in equity, the contract being yet executory on both sides,
the defendant, himself free from fraud or other personal bar, could not
have the remedy of specific performance against the plaintiff, then the contract is so lacking in mutuality that equity will not compel the defendant
to perform but will leave the plaintiff to his remedy at law."
'49 Am.. L RM., 270, 382, 445, 5o7, 559 and 5o Am. L. REG., 65, 251, 329,
523.

'3 COL. L Rrv. z. On few legal questions have the courts more frequently quoted the writers on legal theory than on this doctrine of lack of
mutuality. In almost all the cases cited below some one of the writers mentioned was quoted, in many of them several were quoted or -referred to.
' See, for example, Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence, 4922; Clark, Equity,
22r.

9 Stone, "Mutuality Rule in New York," i6 CoL- L Ray. 443 (1916);
Durfee, "Mutuality Rule in Specific Performance," 20 Mics. L. Rr-. 289
(1922).

"The cases covered in this Note are those decided since the close of the
World War, November, 1x1&
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jurisprudence. 12 Like the poor Indian, it is found as a living principle only in the, far west, 12 and even there its hold is precarious. is
Its ghost has, however, stalked through the opinions in other jurisdictions but without permanently influencing their decisions?" In
New York and Illinois, the strict doctrine confused the courts even
in some of the recent cases, but the latest decisions in both jurisdictions apparently follow the more liberal view. The strict rule was
invoked in both states to defeat the right of a plaintiff who was the
assignee of the original contracting party in contracts involving the
sale or exchange of realty. The court held that, as the defendant
could not have obtained specific performance from the plaintiff, who
had not assumed the obligations of the original contract, the plain.
tiff could not, therefore, because of the doctrine of mutuality, get
specific performance against the defendant. 1" It is difficult to see,
however, why specific performance should be refused in such cases
when the assignee tenders a deed to the property, or the price of it,
as the case may be, on or before filing suit. In view of later pronouncements and decisions of the Illinois Supreme Court, it is
doubtful if these cases would still be sustained there. 1' In New
York, the ghost was effectively laid within the last year in a masterly
opinion of the Court of Appeals, delivered by Justice Cardozo. "If
there ever was [such] a rule . . . in this jurisdiction," he says,
"it has ceased to be a rule today." 1"
u Lack of mutuality at the time the contract was made has been held no
179, x33 N. E. 7z5
defence in the following cases: Smurr v. Kamen, 3ox Ill.
(192r); Rittenhouse v. Swiecicki, iz8 AtI. 26r (N. J. 1922); Epstein v.
Gluckin, 233 N. Y. 490, 135 N. F. 86i (1922); Heald v. Marden Co., 233 N.
Y. 575, 135 N. E. 924 (1922); Rollyson v. Brown, 8s W. Va. I5, ioo S. E.
682 (i9x9); Union Bag Co. v. Bischoff, 255 Fed. 187 (D. C. x918) (dictum);

Stutsman v. Crain, i85 Ia. 514, 17o N. W. 8o6 (igig) (dictum).
"Woolsey v. Draper, 1o3 Or. 1o3, 2o1 Pac. 73o (192z); Childs v. Reed,

34 Idaho 450, 202 Pac. 685 (192t). In neither of these cases was the decision based wholly on lack of mutuality, and the court might well have
refused specific performance on other grounds. In the Oregon case, the
plaintiff had not signed a memorandum sufficient to bind him under the
Statute of Frauds.
ICf. Goodwin v. Cornelius, io Or. 422, 2oo Pac. 915 (1921), where the
court granted specific performance when the.plaintiff's executdry services had
been fully performed before he brought suit.
'Roller v. Weigle, 49 App. D. C. io2, 261 Fed. 250 (1919); Antero Res-.
ervoir Co. v. Lowe, 69 Colo. 4o9, 194 Pac. 945 (i92); Moody v. Crane, 34
Idaho io3, 199 Pac. 652 (i92); Zaring v. Lavatta, 211 Pac. 557 (Idaho,
1922).
589, 121 N. F. 237 (I918); Schuyler v.
Lunt v. Lorscheider, 285 Ill.
Kirk-Brown Realty Co., 193 N. Y. App. Div. 269, 184 N. Y. S.95 (192o).
I Smurr v. Kamen, 301 Ill. 179, 133 N. . 715 (i92i); Wurn v. Berkson, 305 Ill. 23r, 137 N. F. 141 (922).
"Epstein v. Gluckin, 233 N. Y. 490, 493, 135 N. E. 861, 86a (1922).

See,

also, on the rule in New York, 8 CaNELL L.Q. 69 (z92z). Cf. the opinion
in Elk Refining Co. v. Falling Rock Coal Co, i15 S. E.43r (192i), containing a sweeping denial of the strict doctrine of mutuality of remedy.
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The somewhat similar and equally artificial rule that an option
is ipso facto lacking in mutuality and unenforcible finds just as little
favor in the recent decisions. The courts, in general, recognize that
when the plaintiff has filed his bill in such cases, the defendant's
offer is accepted, and there are then mutually enforcible obliga9
but the libThere are some dicta in recent cases contra,"
tions.'
eral rule is now so well recognized in most jurisdictions that lack
of mutuality, as a defence to the specific performance of an option
contract seems to be seldom noticed by, or even suggested to, the
courts. 20

The third class of cases, that in which the plaintiff has the option to terminate the contract at his pleasure, or after a fixed time,
is the one which seems to give the courts the most trouble. The
typical instance is to be found in the common form of lease of lands
in mining, especially oil-mining, districts to prospecting companies.
These leases give the lessee, but not the lessor, the option to abandon the lease at any time during the term. As has been often
pointed out, this class of cases doesn't involve the doctrine of mutuality at all. 21 The court can specifically enforce either side of the
contract. The fact that the contract binds one party for a, long
period and the other for a short period should be no bar to enforcement. The courts apparently have lost sight of the fact that
the plaintiff has paid for this privilege in an increased rental. There
is no reason why the court should not decree specific performance
by the defendant so long as the plaintiff fulfils his obligations under
the contract. Yet there has been serious dispute on this question on
a ground one would call specious if it had not been fathered by such
eminent courts. 22 It is contended that there is no mutuality of
obligation and that the plaintiff can render the decree of the court
nugatory at any time by availing himself of his option to terminate
the contract. This objection seems to have little force, inasmuch
as the court can give either party what he stipulated for. Yet in the
only decision on this point since the war 2 s specific performance was
"Leonard v. Schnaier, ig N. Y. Misc. 2o, x96 N. Y. S. r73 (xgz);
Giannini v. Foster, Iig N. Y. Misc. 343, x96 N. Y. S. 247 (gzz).
In City of
Saginaw v. Consumers Power Co., 213 Mich. 460, x82 N. W. 146 (g2i),'it
was held that a public service company cannot set up lack of mutuality as a
defence against suits by citizens (or by the city as their representative) for
specific performance of services contracted to be supplied by the company.
I Fox v. Fraebel, x4o Md. _g4, zz6 At. 876 (x922).
"This seems to be the case in Pennsylvania today. Hannan. v. Carroll, Supreme Court, Jan. T., 1923, No. 85 (not yet reported).
' Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence (4th ed.), 4935. Philadelphia Ball
Club v. Lajoie, 2o2 Pa. 210, S1 .At. 973 (19o2).
"Rutland Marble Co. v. Ripley, io Wall. 339, 359, r9 L. ed. 955 (187o)
(dictum); Rust v. Conrad, 47 Mich. 449, 11 N. W. 265 (x882).
" Dabney v. Key, 207 Pac. 921 (Cal. i922) (contract for oil lease terminable at lessee's option).
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refused owing to lack of mutuality of obligation. The court in that
case, however, did not deny the cogent arguments against this defence, but held that it must recognize the defence on the ground of
stare decisis. 24 Only dicta 25 the other way in recent cases show the
influence of the able opinions and equally able arguments of the

text-writers that lack of mutuality is no defence to a decree on
such a contract, and that specific performance conditional upon the
plaintiff's continued performance of his obligations will assure the
defendant of all he contracted for.
There remains the class of cases in which mutuality is a real
defense-those cases in which the plaintiff is an infant and those in
which the plaintiff has not fully executed the personal services called
for in the contract. in these cases the court can give the defendant
no assurance of getting what he contracted for, and will not, therefore, compel him specifically to perform his contract. 2 6 The recent
decisions on this point are unanimous in refusing specific performanc e. 27

There is still another class of cases in which this defense is
interposed-that in which the plaintiff has neither bound himself in
any way, nor paid anything to or done anything for the defendant.' Of course, the defense will stand under such facts, but it
should be noted that this defense is entirely different from that which
we have been considering. In such a case there is not only no mutual"Dicta approving the rule followed in the last-cited case are found in.
the following cases: Reo Co. v. Young, 9ogMich. 578, 177 N. W. 249
(i92o); Merrill v. Rocky Mountain Co, 26 Wyo. 219, 181 Pac. 964 (i919).
" Elk Refining Co. v. Falling Rock; Coal Co., uxi S. E. 43 (W. Va.
1922).

"This lays out of consideration the cases where the services are so
unique as to form a basis for an injunction against breach of the contract.
Lumley v. Wagner, i De Gex, M. & G. 604 (Eng. 1852); Phila. Ball Club v.
Lajoie, 4upra in Niote 2x. Whether in a converse case here, if the artist
or player were suing, the defence of lack of mutuality could be urged
against a decree, seems never to have been decided.
"Roller v. Weigle, 49 App. D. C. io, 2oo Pac. 915 (192); Berry v.
Moulie, i8o CaL 137, 179 Pac. 686 (1919); Roy v. Pos., 183 Cal. 359, 191
Pac. 5V (ig2o); Poultry Producers, Inc., v. Barlow, 208 Pac. 93 (CaL
1922); Moody v. Crane, 34 Idaho io3, igg Pac. 652 (192); Zaring v. Lavatta, 21 "Pac. 557 (Idaho 1922); Hoppes v. Hoppes, 129 N. E. 629 (Ind.
192); Falder v. Dreckshage, 227 S. W. 929 (Mo. App. i92); Paul v.
Lentz, i88 N. W. zoz2 (N. D. 922). In the following cases specific performance was refused when the husband aiore sued on a contract by which
he and his wife agreed to make a conveyance, in states where the wife's
deed requires personal acknowledgment to be valid: Wurn v. Berkson, 305
Ill. 231, 137 N. E. 141 (1922); Marti v. Ludeking, 193 Ia. 50o, i8S N. W.

476

(1921).

'Battle v. Smith, 28 Ga. App. 76o, 13 S. E. 235 (I922) (in dissenting
opinion); Walton's Ex'r v. Franks, 191 Ky. 32, 228 S. W. 102.5 (xg2x); Johnson v. Breckenridge-Stephens Title Co., 241 S. W. 195 (Tex. Civ. App.
29m).
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ity, but no contract at all. It is merely the offer to the plaintiff of
a unilateral contract, which he has not yet accepted when he files his
bill. Of course, under such circumstances the defendant is not even
bound at law, much less subject to a decree of specific performance
in equity.
It is coming to be generally recognized in the recent cases that
the doctrine of lack of mutuality is, after all, solely for the purpose
-of working out the equities between the parties, and that,, provided there is a valid contract in the first place, even though unenforcible at the time when made, if this bar is removed when' the
plaintiff has brought his bill, equity ought to enforce the contract
specifically at the suit of one party if it can assure the other of what
he contracted for. The difficulty of laying down any more definite
rule is obvious. 21 Every case must be governed on this point by all
the peculiar circumstances surrounding it. As Justice Cardozo states,
"The principle had its origin in an attempt to fit the equitable
remedy to the needs of equal justice. We may not suffer it to
petrify at the cost of its animating principle."' 0

.F. F.
THu

BuRDEN OF PROvING SELF.DEFENSE.-In

the recent Penn-

sylvania case of Comronwealth v. W/Vcinberg, the defendant, who

was being tried on an indictment for murder, did not deny the intentional killing, but endeavored to show by the evidence that he
had acted in self-defense. The Court charged the jury that if they
believed beyond a reasonable doubt that the prisoner had intentionally shot the deceased, then the burden lay on the prisoner to
convince them by a preponderance of evidence that he had acted in
self-defense; and that a doubt in their minds as to the establishment
by the prisoner of this defense was not ground for an acquittal, but
might properly justify a conviction of manslaughter. On appeal this
charge was held to be correct by the State Supreme Court. I
The decision in the ab6ve case is in accord with the law of
about'a quarter of the American jurisdictions. In these jurisdictions, when once the state has proved, or the prisoner has admitted,
that the deceased died through his voluntary act, then the burden
lies on him to prove to the jury by the fair weight of the testimony
that he was justified. 2 Sometimes the language used is "if the case
Durfee, "Mutuality in Specific Performance,"

2o Mica. L

REV. 289

(1922).
Epstein v. Gluckin, supra in Note I7.

1276 Pa. 255 (1923).
'Pennsylvania:

Comm. v. Drum, 58 Pa. 9 (1868); Comm. v. Palmer,

Pa. 299, 7x Adt. zoo (igo8); Comm. v. Brown, xi Pa. Dist. Rep. 89
(igo8). Elsewhere: State v. Byers, zoo N. C. 5i2, 6 S. E. 42o (x888);

2

NOTES

of the prosecution shows the homicide and none of the surrounding circumstances," or "if an intentional killing with a deadly weapon is shown,"" then such burden is on the prisoner. In most of
these jurisdictions the prisoner must prove his justification by only
the preponderance of the evidence, but in a few he must satisfy the
jury beyond a reasonable doubt.'
It is not surprising that there is a conflict of opinion on this
subject. Blackstone, ' Foster? and East 8 lay down the rule followed in the principal case, but the cases on which they rely seem
to support their conclusion no more surely than they do the opposite conclusion drawn by the courts in the majority of jurisdictions, as shown in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Wilde in
Commonwealth v. York, 9 the leading case on the subject. The
cases cited by these writers do state that if an intentional homicide
is proved and nothing further, malice will be presumed. 10 (This
was part of the substantive rule which the Norman conquerors enforced-that any man found dead was presumed to be a Frenchman, and to have been murdered.) "I But when these cases say that
the burden of proving justification is on the prisoner, they surel)
mean only that if the case made out by the prosecutiorf contains no
evidence of circumstances which would rebut the presumption of
malice, the task of introducing such evidence is on the prisoner. 12
121, 127, 8 So. 98 (1889) ; Szalkai v. State, 96 Ohio
St. 36, 117 N. E. 12 (917); Rice, Evidence, 479 (1893 ed.) 'Other jurisdictions in accord are Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Delaware, West Virginia,
South Carolina, Oregon and Utah.
'Comm. v. York, So Mass. 93, 43 Am. Dec. 373 (1845); Comm. v.
McKie, 67 Mass. 61, 61 Am. Dec. 410 (1854).
"State v. Byers, supra in Note 2; Wikins v. State, 98 Ala. z, x3 So.

Gibson v, State. 89 Ala.

312 (1893).
'State

v. Byers, .upra in Note

2;

State v. Powell, 5 Penn. 24, 6r AtL

966 (Del. i9o4).

44 Bl. 201.

'Foster, Crown Cases 255.
'East, Pleas to the Crown 224.
'Supra in Note 3 at p. 125.
"Maclcalley's Case, 9 Coke 67 (16tI); Legge's Case, J. Kelyng 27
.(1662); Oneby's Case, 2 Lord Raymond 1494 (1727); Rex v. Greenacre,
8 Car. & P. 35 (1837); Queen v. Kirkham, & Car. & P. i6 (1837).
'Rex v. Mawgridge, J. Kelyng 122 (1662). Lord Holt: "If a man was
found to be slain it was always intended first, that he was a Frenchman,
second, that he was killed by an Englishman; third, that the killing was
murder; fourth, if any one was apprehended to be the murderer, he was.
to be tried by fire and water, though he killed him by misfortune, which
was extended beyond reason and justice in favor of the Normans." He goes
on to explain that these laws or ordinances were repealed by Act of Parliament, 14 Edw. 3, c. 4.

"Brown v. State,

32o

62

N. J. L 666, 42 AtL 811 (z8981; Cupps v..State,

Wis. 5o4, 97 N. W. 21o (19o3).
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The expression, "burden of proof" is undoubtedly used in its secondary meaning-the duty of producing some sort of evidence to
rebut a prima tadie case 8-- not in its primary meaning, the burden
of convincing Cie jury. For this reason the majority of jurisdictions holds that if either the prosecution or the defense produces any
evidence of circumstances upon which a belief of justification
can be based, the "presumption of malice" is met; the prosecution
must prove from all the evidence produced by both sides that the
prisoner was guilty of all the elements of the crime Ilk-and the mental element, malice, must be proved like the killing, not by any presumption, but by the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt.15
Aside from precedent, the rule shown in the principal case
seems in direct contravention of the ordinary maxim of the cornmon law that a man is presumed to be innocent until proved guilty
of every element of a crime. But it has been supported by the
analogy of the burden of proving a civil defense. There should,
however, be no need of making the requirements of a civil and a
criminal defense the same. The fact that there are no affirmative
pleadings in crimes (save pardon and former jeopardy), is not the
reason for the difference. The difference lies in the fact that the
basis of a civil suit is-the breach of the plaintiff's rights, whereas
the basis of a criminal action is a breach of the peace of the commonwealth. It is prima facie an invasion of the plaintiff's rights if
another lay violent hands upon his person, and proof of the defendant's wrongful intention is not essential to his case; so the defendant
in a civil suit has the burden of proving his excuse. On the contrary, there is no breach of the peace of the commonwealth unless
the mental element of a wrongful intention can be proved in addition to the act. In a private suit for damages for a killing, the
burden of proving justification is properly put on the defendant. I*

Merely describing self-defense and insanity as "'afflrmaltve defenses" is no ground for putting the burden of proof 6n the defendant in a criminal action. A defense which denies the mental ele-

ment of the crime as these defenses do, is no less negative than alibi,
State v. Wingo, 66 Mo. 18x, i88, W Am. Rep. 329. (1877); Buswell v
Fuller, 89 Me. 6oo, 602, 36 Ad. iO59 (1897); Cody v. Market St. R. Co.,

x48 Cal. go, 8z Pac. 666 (i9oS); Wig-more, Evidence (xgoS Ed.), Sec. 2486.
.People v. Coughlin, 65 Mich. 7o4, 32 N. W. 9.o5 0887) ; People v. Shanley, 49 N. Y. App. Div. 6, 63 N. Y. S. 449 (rgoo); ZipperJan v. People, 33 CoL 134, 79 Pac. ioi8 (i9o5); Greenleaf, Evidence (i5th
ed.), Sec. 74; Wigmore, Evidence (xgos ed.), Sec. 2512; 2 Bishop, New Criminal Procedure (2d ed.), Se.. wo48.
'Hawthorn v. State, 58 Miss. 778, 787 (880; Vollmer- v. State, 24
Neb. 838 kg, 4o N. W. 420 (888).
"Brooks v. Harlan, 6s Cat 424, 4 Pac. 399 (z884); Tucker v. State, 89
Md. 47, 43 AtL 778 (t889).
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which denies the killing by the prisoner, and the burden of proving
an alibi is never imposed on the prisoner.
The most plausible argument which may be advanced in support of the rule of the principal case is the need for protecting
human life, and the expedition of justice by depriving persons accused of crime of one of the many advantages with which their
position is hedged by common law, which are no longer vitally necessary for their protection through the minimizing of criminal punishments. 11 This may be arguable in states which have abolished the.
death penalty, but Pennsylvania is not one of these. It would seem
a great denial of justice in a trial for a crime for which that penalty
may be imposed to deprive the accused person of the greatest safeguard afforded by the law of the Anglo-Saxons, the presumption of
innocence-which ought not to alter.
W. C. F., Jr.
INCOMPETENCY OF COUNSEL AS THE BASIS FOR A

NEw

TRIAL IN

CAsEs.-The not infrequent jeopardizing of a man's life
in a criminal trial by the inefficiency or negligence of his attorney has
given rise to a new doctrine which, in several jurisdictions, has permitted a letting down of the bars of strict legal procedure. Except under extraordinary circumstances of surprise, a verdict will
not be set aside because improper evidence was admitted if no objection to its adission was made on trial. 1 But in a recent Illinois
case where such evidence was admitted to the prejudice of the defendant because of the negligence of his attorney, the court granted
a new trial notwithstanding the2 fact that the question had not been
The general principle there exproperly reserved for review.
pounded was: "Where the evidence is close and it is clear that the
prosecuting attorney has taken advantage of the accused because he
was poorly represented and the trial court has permitted such advantage to be taken, then we will consider the errors, notwithstanding the failure to properly preserve the questions for review." 2
It may be stated as practically a universal principle of law
that a new trial will not be granted in a civil case on the ground
of the negligence or incompetency of the attorney of the party applying for it. 3 The basis for the rule is that the neglect of the atCRIMINAL

i33

L. REv. 6o8 (919-2o).
'Walker v. State, 39 Ark. 2= (1882); III Wharton, Criminal Procedure, sec. 1743 (toth ed. 918).
HARV.

'People v. Gardiner, 303 Ill. 204 (1922). The case was a murder trial
in which evidence of other crimes committed by the defendant of a highly
prejudicial nature was admitted without objection, although clearly raising
collateral issues.
2

P. 207.

*See

casm

note to

29

Amer. & Eng. Annotated Cases 499 for a long list of
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torney is equivalent to the neglect of the party himself since he has
presented the attorney to the world as his accredited agent. ' Under
such circumstances a remedy may be sought against the attorney. a
Obviously in a criminal case, where a defendant; has been convicted of murder because of evidence negligently permitted to be introduced by his counsel, he cannot bring an action against his attorney and recover his life. Notwithstanding that distinction, the
courts, even in criminal cases, displayed a tendency to adopt the
strict principle of the civil law and hence it was held generally that
the ordinary negligence of counsel was no ground for a new

trial. '
At first the courts required an affirmative showing that the
error would-have changed the verdict before a new trial would be
granted.'
But later, tie injury to the defendant caused by the
omission or commission of his attorney was established as the test.
Thus in People v. Barnes8 it was decided that the fact that a per-

son charged with a crime was poorly defended would not justify a
reversal of the judgment if it was reasonably supported by the evidence. So it has been held that the inexperience or intoxication of
defendant's counsel is no ground for a new trial, where it does not

appear that he was prejudiced by either. 9 Similarly, the fact that
the attorney was mentally unbalanced,"0 or sick, "I or tired, 12 was
not considered sufficient grounds.
But a new trial was granted where counsel waived his right to

a charge by the judge for fear of wearying the jury. 23 Also the
fact that the lawyer for the defense did not avail himself of a right
to change of venue on account of local prejudice because of his fear
'See opinion in Jones v. Leech, 46 Ia. T86 (1877). Also see in support
of the general rule: Kirby v Shadwell, 1o Mo. 392 (7847) ; Merritt v. Putnam, 7 Minn. 493 (1862); Matter of Quinn, 5 N. Y. S. 261 (i889).
, Smith v. Tunstead, 56 Cal. 175 (i88o); and Note in 29 Amer. & Eng.
Annotated Cases, 499.
'People v. O'Brien, 4 Park 2o3 (1854); Hudson v. State, 76 Ga. 727
(1886); Vowells v. Commonwealth, 15 Ky. 574 (1894).
'State v. Benge, 61 Iowa 658 (1883), where, although the court refused a new trial because there was no affirmative showing that the error
would have changed the verdict, the court said: "In criminal cases and especially in cases involving the life of the defendant, the court would probably
be justified in adhering to the rule somewhat less strictly."
:27o 111.
574, 1io N. E. 88 (ix5).
'O'Brien. v. Commonwealth, I5 Ky. 6o8, 74 S. W. 666 (z903); Territory v. Clark, i3N. M. 59. 78 Pac. 708 (19o5). But in both those cases the
trial court suspended the trial to give the attorney time to become sober.
" State v. Bethune, 93 S. C. 195, 75 S. E. 281 (i9gr).
1
Vowells v. Commonwealth, supra in Note 6.
' Hange v. State, 9g Ga. 212, 25 S. E. 2o4 (i896); Tiller v. State, xxo
Ga. 250, 34 S. E. 2o4 (1899).
'State v. Swayze, 3o La. Ann. 1323 (r878).
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of mob violence to his client, was held to be sufficient basis for a
new trial. 1 ,
The decisions in the state of Missouri are illustrative of the
general confusion of the courts in decisions on this subject. The
first case decided in that jurisdiction 15 held that one convicted of
murder might be granted a new trial because of the gross ignorance,
incompetency or imbecility of his attorney where it appeared that
the defense was not fairly presented. Although that decision was
later affirmed,' the court in State v. Dreher2" expressly overruled
it, deciding that the incompetency of defendant's attorney in a murder trial was not sufficient grounds for a new trial. But the failure
of the court to appreciate the distinction between civil and -criminal
cases is shown by the citation in support of its decision of two civil
cases, 18 where the reason for the rule is radically different.
The question of what is "prejudice" has also given rise to
considerable confusion. Frequently detriment to one court will not
be considered so by another and the cases in many instances must
be judged by their special facts. 2" Thus where counsel neglected to
summon witnesses whose names were given him by his client, a new
trial was granted. 20 But a later case in the same jurisdiction 21 held
that a refusal on the part of the defense to call certain witnesses was
not ground for a new trial.
The recent Illinois case of People v. Schuhnan 22 has extended
the rule still further by deciding that even though proof of the
negligent omission by the defendant's counsel might pxossibly not
produce a different result, a reviewing court cannot say that it would
not. a
The same strictness which at first characterized the decisions of
the courts in criminal cases where the attorney was selected by the
defendant himself earlier appeared even in cases where the
attorney was appointed by the court. 24 But later courts, recognizing
"Roper v. Commonwealth, 7 N, M. 255, 33 Pac. 1014 (1893).
" State v. Jones, 12 Mo. App. 93 (1882).
"State v. Jones, 79 Mo. 44T (1883).
i 137 Mo. App. I, 38 S. W. 567 (1897).

"'Field v. Matson, 8 Mo. 686 (1844) ; Gherke v. Jod, _9 Mo. 522 (1875).
"People v. Laures, 289 Ill. 490, 124 N. E. 585 (i92o). See is It.. I
REV. 40 (1920-21).
* State v. Lewis, 9 Mo. App. 321 (188o).
"State v. Elliott, 16 Mo. App. 552 (1885).
=299 I1. 125 (19i).
'In that case, counsel for the defense did not understand how to avail
himself of the privilege of showing that the prosecution had changed the
charge from slapping the prosecutor's daughter to taking indecent liberties with
her.
" Fambles v. State, 97 Ga. 625. 25 S. E. 365 (1895) ; Keyes v. State, 122
Ind. 527, 23 N. E. io97 (z889); Brcwn v. State; 57 Ter- Crim. 267, io6 S.

*W.368 (xgWo),
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that the defendant has not an option to select or reject the counsel
appointed by the court, have laid down the rule that omissions of
counsel assigned by the court will be scrutinized more closely by the
court than if he had been employed by the prisoner. " In People v.
Blevins2 6 the court granted a new trial because the counsel for the
defendants were "over-matched" and "not well-equipped by experience and practice for the burden placed upon them." 2"
The right of an appellate court to review evidence to which the
proper exception had not been taken on the ground of incompetency
of the attorney was not fully discussed until the case of People v.
Anderson. 28 In that case the court held that even though it appeared that through the negligencb or mistake of counsel in the trial
court the rights of the accused had not been preserved in such a
manner that material questions could, by ordinary rule, be reviewed
in the upper court, such failure did not change the law pertaining to
review of records of nisi prius tribunals. But the court in People
v. Gardiner,lB overruled that decision, holding that persons should
not be convicted upon incompetent evidence unless the court could
say that the admission of such evidence was not prejudicial, thus
shifting the burden of proving prejudice from the defendant to the
commonwealth. s*
The whole question resolves itself into the balancing of fairness
on the one hand against strict legal procedure on the other. Logically speaking, it is submitted, the decision in the Anderson Case "
is correct, but, after all, the purpose of a criminal trial is to
convict only the guilty, and if an innocent man has suffered because
of the incompetency of his attorney why should he not be allowed
"State v. Williams, 9 Houst. 5o8, x8 AtM 949 (Del. 189o).
=25 II. 38r, 96 N. . 214 (i9rx). In that case, in -addition to the district attorney for the Commonwealth, the prosecution had employed an array
of legal talent far outclassing the young, inexperienced attorney who had
been appointed by the court for the defendant.
= See, for a discussion of that case, 6 ILL. L. Rav. 4o9 (1911-12), and
for a -discussion of the distinction between cases where the court appoints
the defendant's attorney and where he employs one of his own selection, see
x5 IW. L. REv. 40 (1g2o-2i).
239

Il1.168, 87 N. . 86o (igog).

Supra in Note z
" The paucity of cases decided expressly upon this point may be accounted
for by the fact that wherever possible the appellate courts have avoided
taking any stand m the question by deciding the case on other grounds. An
illustration in point is found in the recent case of Commonwealth v. Puglise, Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, decided January 29, r923, in which,

on the argument, it was urged that the incompetency of the attorney in the
trial below warranted a new trial. The court granted a new trial, but based
its written opinion entirely on the errors of law of the court below. See
71 U. oF PA. L. REv. 281 (1922-23).

n Supra in Note 28.

NOTES

a new trial? That is the view taken in
2 the most recent Illinois case,
and is, it is submitted, the fairer one.
D.F.M.
THE INTERPOATION OF WORDS IN CONTRACTS.-It is generally

recognized that where a portion of a written contract is ambiguous,
not clear, or meaningless, the court will insert a word or give a
word a different meaning to carry out the manifest intent of the
rest of the contract.1 Thus "and" is sometimes read "or" and vice
versa, 2 but only if it is obvious from the rest of the agreement that
it was intended to be so read, for "and" being a conjunctive ought not
to be read as a disjunctive unless it is very clear that the parties so
intended it. I
In a recent Pennsylvania case4 a contract of fire insurance on
an ice plant provided that if the insured should be entirely prevented
from operating the plant the company would be liable for loss not
exceeding $16.6 7 per day. It then went on to state that if the plant
should be partially disabled, so as to prevent the full daily average
of profits, then the company would be "liable per day for that proportion of not exceeding $16.67 which the profit so prevented from
being realized bears to the full average daily profit previous to the
fire." Another provision stated the purpose of the policy to be the
reimbursement of the insured for loss of profits, and still another
stated that the intention was that the insured be indemnified for
actual loss of profits. The doubtful part was "that proportion of

'The public press recently reported that the Court of Appeals of New
York, after affirming the judgment of the trial court in a first decree murder
case, wrote to the Governor recommending that he commute the death sentence to life imprisonment. The court, it was said, gave as its reason for this
extraordinary move its belief that the condemned man had been improperly
defended at the trial.
'C. B. & Q. R. R. Co. v. Bartlett, 72o Ill. 5o3, it N. R_ 867 (7887);
Potthoff v. Safety Armorite Conduit Co., 143 App. Div. 16I, 127 N. Y. S. 944
(igit). In this connection it is interesting to note the language of Thompson, C. J., in Frazier v. Monroe,'7,2 Pa. 166 (1872).
He states that, in
interpreting contracts, the courts "are not allowed to add words, or to consider words and sentences to be in, that are not there. This can only
be done on the principle of reforming contracts on account of omissions
or improper insertions, under the equitable head of fraud, accident or mistake. That is not interpretation, it is reformation." p. x69.
'Decker v. Carr, ix App. Div. 432, 42 N. Y. S. 243 (1896); Mason v.
Dayton, 153 Fed. 258 (C. C. A. i9o7). In Marion v. Faxon, 2o Conn. 486
(185o), "me" was read "him." In Cornell v. Green, 88 Fed. 82r (C. C.
1897), "north" was read "south." In Dodd v. Mitchell, 77 Ind. 388 (1881),
"fail" was inserted in a penalty clause.
*Dumont v. U. S., 98 U. S. 142 (1878); Atlantic Terra Cotta Co. v.
Mason's Supply Co., i8o Fed. 332 (C. C. A. igxo).
'Nusbaum v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., Pa. Supreme Ct., Jan. Term i923,
No. 9 (Schaffer, I.).
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not exceeding $16.67," which was meaningless as the proportion was
not expressed. The court changed the word "of' to read "thereof"
thus making a logical sentence, the "thereof" referring to "daily
average of profits." The insurance company claimed that the passage should have been read "that proportion of $16.67 not exceeding
$16.67," which, as the court said, would at most be a very awkward
form of expression.
In addition to the rule allowing the interpolation of a word to
express the intent of the parties as shown in the rest of the contract
there are several other lines of cases which allow interpolation. In one
class, interpolation has been allowed where the intention of the
parties was not clear from the contract, but where there were other
indications of their intent, such as prior conduct of the parties or
outside evidence. 3 In- one case a proposed form of contract, discarded for other reasons, supplied the court with this information. '
In another, where the date of judgment in an appeal bond was
In a case
wrong, it was changed by the court on evidence given.
involving an insurance policy the amount of the premium was not
filled in, but on the margin was written "Premium $5" and the
court inserted this amount for the premium. I
In another line of cases the courts have inserted or changed
words to carry out what the courts tfiought was the intention of the
parties though no such intent was manifest. 9 The court in one
case looked into the circumstances of the case and the relation of
the parties and decided that, in a contract to deliver bonds in a
certain event, the bonds did not have to be delivered on the happening of that event. 10 A deed conveying a certain plot of land described as beifng i6o acres was read to mean 185 acres, where the
court thought the whole lot was meant to be conveyed. "I
Finally there is a class of cases where the instrument is clear
as it stands, but the courts change the words where they think
proper. 1 2 But this is not very strongly supported by authority, for
'Lycoming Fire Ins. Co. v. Woodworth, 83 Pa. 223 (1876).
'Potthoff v. Safety Armorite Conduit Co., 143 App. Div. I61, r27 N. Y.
S. 944 (1911).
'Blanchard v. Gloyd, 7 Rob. (La.) 542 (1846).
'Pacific Surety Co. of Cal. v. Toye, 224 Mass. 98, xx9 N. E. 653 (z916).
*Fredenburg v. Turner, 37 Mich. 402 (1877).* A promise to pay in
"sawing and lumber" was construed to mean payment in equal proportions of
"sawing and lumber."
"'Williamson v. McClure, 37 Pa. 402 (i86o).
"' Hathaway v. Power, 6 Hill (N. Y.) 453 (1844).
' In Dodd v. Mitchell, 77 Ind. 388 (x88r), 'the word "yearly" was inserted in a lease to make the payment yearly instead of for five years, and
in Jackson v. Topping, i Wend. (N. Y.) 388 (i828), "and" was read "or"
even though it worked a forfeiture.
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there are many cases where contracts, clear as they stood, were
suffered to stand, even though it was probable that the intent of
the parties was otherwise. 13 For instance, where a person guaranteed payment of all bills of A. B. and C. D. it was held that "and"
meant that the guarantor was only liable for default in payments of
the joint bills of A. B. and C. D. and not for their separate bills,
though it seemed probable that the separate debts were meant. -1
The court in the principal case did not seem to base its decision
on any particular one of these groups of cases, but rather on all
together. It might have been decided on the general rule that where
the intent is clear from the rest of the contract, a word will be
interpolated to clear up a passage, for'in two places in the policy
it was stated that the purpose was to reimburse the insured for loss
of profits, and hence the court's interpretation would seem to carry
out that intent by allowing a recovery of the actual loss of profits,
not exceeding the limit of $16.67. However, there is another way of
looking at the situation. If the limit of $16.67 per day was set for
the loss of the entire profits, this would seem to be the estimated
average profit per day and thus for a partial loss of profits, it might
be argued, a recovery of only a certain proportion of $16.67 was
intended. It is probable that the court was influenced by the rule
that an insurance policy is always construed most strictly against
the company, "I so that even if the two considerations had been
evenly balanced that rule would have turned the scales in favor of
the insured.
H. B. C., Jr.

FOREIGN DIVORCE WITHOUT PERSONAL SERVICE AND SOME OF

ITS CONSEQENcEs.-The complications that have continued to arise
as a result of different laws in the various states with respect to
marriage and divorce present an almost insoluble problem. So long
as the present sovereignty of the states persists and the subjection
thereto of the marital status of their citizens continues, there will be
situations where, at the same time, a person is married according
to the laws of one state and single according to the laws of another. The situation was not remedied by the decision in the well"Bridgers

v. Ormona,

153 N. C. 113 (xgio). In Rice v. (. S., 53 Fed.

9io (C. C. A. 1893), a statute imposing a duty on "embroidered and- hem-.
stitched handkerchiefs" was held to apply only to such as were both "em-

broidered and hemstitched."

- Mayer v. Cook, 57 N. Y. S. 94 (Sup. Ct. i89).

"See Note r, supra.
'Liverpool, etc., Ins. Co. v. Kearney, i8o U. S. 1.32 (xgoi); Bone v.
Detroit Nat'l Fire Ins. Co., 261 Pa. 355 (xgx8).
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known case of Haddock v. Haddock,' the only effect of which appears to have been to stimulate an adherence to their principles of
those states having strict divorce laws. In that case it was held
that a decree of divorce rendered in a state other than that of the
matrimonial domicile against a wife residing in -the matrimonial domicile and not personally served was not entitled to full faith and
credit under the Constitution. The case has been severely criticized, 2
but it has been followed 3 and seems firmly established law. Where,
however, the divorce has been granted in the jurisdiction of the
matrimonial domicile, such decree is entitled to full faith and credit
under the Constitution, though the defendant was not personally
served. ' This proposition also seems well settled. ' Such being the
state of the law, it rests with the state courts to determine whether
or not they will recognize, on principles of comity, a foreign decree
of divorce against one of their citizens 'not personally served. If they
refuse to recognize the foreign decree, it is void in those states, and
has no effect on property rights there, 6 and the widow's dower
rights are, consequently, unaffected. 7 The typical effect of the decision in Haddock v. Haddock B is illustrated by such a case as Bell
2,. Little et al., " decided recently by the Appellate Division of the
Supreme Court of New York. A man and a woman, both domiciled in New York, were married there. They lived -together in
New York for a number of years. The wife went to Pennsylvania
and secured a divorce without personal service on the husband, alleging that she had been thrown out of her house by her husband.
While in Pennsylvania, she married Bell, also a New York citizen,
and both returned to New York. Bell died and she claimed her
dower rights in his estate. The court rejected her claim, on the
ground that she was not his wife, the Pennsylvania divorce being
void under New York law, since the defendant was never personally
served. While it is the general rule that the capacity to marry is to
be determined by the law of the place where the cere2o 1U. S. 562 (19o6).
'See 1g HARV. L REV. 586 (19o5-o6).
*Perkins v. Perkins, 225 Mass. 82, 113 N. "E. 841 (I916); Thompson v.
Thompson, 89 N. J. Eq. 70,' 103 Atl. 856 (i918); Duncan v. Duncan, 265 Pa.
464, 1o9 AtI. 22o (rgzo).
'Atherton v. Atherton, i81 U. S. x55 (i9oi).
'Thompson v. Thompson, 226 U. S. 55I (1913); Corvin v. Commonwealth, 131 Va. 649, ioS S. E. 65i (i92I); Peterson v. Peterson et al., 207
Pac. 425 (Idaho 1922). See 23 YALE L J. 88 (1913-14) and 13 COL L Ray.
24 (913).

'In re Akin's Estate,

152

N. Y. S. 310

Pa. Super. 367 (1917).
'Reel v. Elder, 62 Pa. 3o8 (I869).
' Supra in Note .
' 197 N..Y. S. .74 (1923).

(1915); Grossman's Estate, 67
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mony is performed, 10 there is also the well-recognized exception
that a marriage contracted by persons legally capacitated under the
laws of the place of the ceremony will not be held valid in another
jurisdiction where it is against Christian laws or the public policy
of the state or in express violation of a statute of that state. 11 The
same holds true with respect to the validity of the marriage ceremony. 12

In Bell v. Little et al. the court regarded the Pennsyl-

vania decree as against the policy of the state of New York and
refused to recognize it. The dissenting opinion, on the other hand,
expressed the view that public policy required recognition of the
Pennsylvania decree. The situation is even more complicated by
the fact that the woman, though adjudged to be married to her
first husband, can claim no matrimonial rights against him. This
result is reached by a curious application of the doctrine of estoppel on the part of the New York courts, by virtue of which she will
not be heard to impeach the decree of divorce she has obtained in
Pennsylvania. 13 Yet in Kelsey v. Kelsey, 14 another recent New
York case, where the first husband of this same woman sought a
divorce from her on the ground of her adultery with Bell, the court
properly refused to grant it, since he, too, had married again-after
the Pennsylvania divorce. The hopelessness of the situation is apparent.
Unless one of the parties is resident in the state where the
divorce is sought, the court has no jurisdiction to decree a divorce on
constructive service, and a decree if given, of course, would not be
entitled to full faith and credit in any other state. 15 Most courts
require that a change of residence for the purpose of securing a
divorce must be made in good faith. " In a great many states
there are statutes which require residence for a specified period
within the state before an action for divorce can be brought. Where
such residence is required, there is some difference of opinion as to
"In re Spondre, 162 N. Y. S.943, 98 Misc. Rep. 524 (97) ; Hastings
et al. v. Douglass, 249 Fed. 378 (1918) ; Perkey v. Perkey, 87 IV. Va. 656,
Io6 S. F-. 40 (192r).
,Kitzman
v. Werner, 167 Wis. 308, 166 N. W. 789 (1918). See, also,
Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U. S 14 (1903).
"Davidson v. Ream, 161 N. Y. S. 73, 97"Misc. Rep. 89 (1916); Bolmer
v. Edsall, go N. J. Eq. 299, xo6 At. 646 (2919); Lincoln v. Riley, 217 IIl.
App. 571 (1920).
'Starbuck v. Starbuck, 173 N. Y. 5o3, 66 N. E. 193 (29o3).
2I497
N. Y. S. 371 (923), decided by the Appellate Division of the

Supreme Court at the same time as Bell v. Little et al., supra in Note 9.
"Hoffman v. Hoffman, 46 N. Y. 30 (187); Van Fossen v. State, 37
Ohio St. 317 (i88r); Bell v. Bell, i81 U. S.175 (19oi); Streitwolf v Streitwolf, i81 U. S. 179 (1901).

"Hood v. State, 56 Ind. 263 (1877); Cross v. Cross, io8 N. Y. 628
(1888); Commonwealth v. Ainsworth, 6 Pa. Dist. 707 (1897).
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whether a foreign decree is invalidated by the fact that the complainant has not resided in the jurisdiction for the statutory period.
The better view and the weight of authority seems to be that such
a decree is invalid. "
It is firmly established in the law of this country that the wife
may acquire a separate domicile where the husband has given cause
for divorce, and it is immaterial where the offense is committed. 18
Whether she is justified in acquiring a separate domicile, however, is
a question of fact for the court in which the judgment is offered in
determining vhether she has acquired a separate domicile. In the
determination of the question of justification, the foreign adjudication that there was cause and that she had acquired a separate domicile is held to be of no evidential value. 29
H.R.H.
T

I re James, 99 Cal. 374, 33 Pac.
ln

1122

(1893); Jung v. Jungi 85 N. J.

E. 372, 96 At. 499 ('5); Commonwealth v. Ainsworth, supra in Note 16.
But see, Kern v. Field, 68 Minn. 317, i N. W. 393 (1897).
' Cheever v. Wilson, 9 Wall. ioS (U. S. 1869) ; Ditson v. Ditson, 4 R. I.
87 (1856); Clark v. Clark, 191 Mass. 128, 77 N. E. 702 (19o6); Kaufman
v. Kaufman, 177 App. Div. 162, 163 N. Y. S. 566 (1917).

'Thompson v. Thompson, supra in Note 3.

